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No Task Fit for a Soldier? 
Canadian Forces Medical Personnel 
and Humanitarian Relief Missions 
since the Second World War 
Bill Rawling 
Résumé: Les armées modernes du monde industrialisé exécutent leurs opérations selon une doctrine, 
c'est-à-dire une philosophie à laquelle est liée toute une série de procédures elles-mêmes déterminées 
par la situation tactique et stratégique. Ces mêmes armées, cependant, répondent aux besoins de 
gouvernements civils qui ne limitent pas leurs demandes ou leurs instructions aux types d'opérations 
qu'une armée pourrait énoncer dans sa doctrine. Pour les services armées du Canada, tel semble être le 
cas dans le domaine des opérations humanitaires, qui, même si elles ne faisaient pas partie de la 
philosophie opérationnelle de ces services, ont tout de même été d'une certaine importance dans 
l'histoire de l'aviation, de la marine, et de l'armée de terre depuis la fin de la Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale. Cette étude vise à explorer les opérations humanitaires dans la période débutant dans la 
deuxième moitié des années 1940 et prennant fin dans les années 1990, lors de la formation et les 
premières opérations d'une unité spécialisant dans le domaine humanitaire. L'article se penchera 
surtout sur la pratique de la médecine lors de ces missions, pour tenter de déterminer si les praticiens et 
praticiennes des forces armées devaient changer leur approche de base pour accomplir leurs tâches, ou 
si il suffisait tout simplement d'adapter leurs procédures selon la situation opérationnelle. 
Abstract: Modem armies of the industrialized world operate in accordance with a doctrine, that is 
to say a philosophy linked to a series of procedures themselves determined by the tactical and 
strategic environment. These same armies, however, answer to civilian governments that do not 
limit their demands or instructions to the types of operations an army might list in its doctrine. For 
Canada's armed services, such seems to have been the case in regards to humanitarian operations 
which, even if they were not part of these services' operational philosophies, have nonetheless been 
of no little importance in the history of the air force, the navy, and the army since the end of the 
Second World War. This study will explore humanitarian operations from the second half of the 
1940s to the formation and first missions of a unit specializing in such work in the 1990s. It will 
focus mainly on medical practice during these missions and attempt to determine whether medical 
practitioners had to change their basic approach to accomplish their tasks, or whether it sufficed to 
adapt procedures in accordance with the operational situation. 
At the battle of Batoche on 12 May 1885, at the end of the war between 
the Canadian government and the western Métis, the government's 
militia units that had fought Louis Riel's forces were accompanied by 
medical personnel. Military doctors were not only responsible for min-
istering to their own soldiers (among whom there were over a hundred 
injuries); they were also under orders to treat wounded and sick oppo-
nents, especially after the last battle had been fought. One unnamed 
field surgeon, hearing that many Métis were "lying ill and unattended 
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about the districts of Fish Creek and Batoche," set out to find them. 
Near the first battlefield, he and two colleagues treated a patient with a 
lung infection, then moved on to where the climactic engagement had 
taken place. There, the parish priest told them that there were about ten 
wounded men in the area, "mostly convalescent." One, however, named 
Gardapuy, "had been wounded through the lung." The surgeon recol-
lected: "After some trouble I found him, because he feared arrest, and 
on examination discovered that he had a chest filled with fluid. I did not 
feel justified in operating under the circumstances, but gave him a letter 
to the police surgeon at Prince Albert, assuring him that every attention 
would be paid him." Medical practitioners also left a stock of dress-
ings, bandages and other supplies. 
The episode is interesting in that, even before the formation of the 
Canadian Army Medical Corps in 1904, practitioners were being or-
dered to use their skills for other than purely military purposes—in this 
case seeking to convince Métis of the government's good intentions 
after a bloody military campaign. Such would continue to be the case in 
the century and more that followed, even though the Medical Corps' 
own doctrine (and later, that of the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian 
Air Force, and Canadian Forces Medical Service, or CFMS) clearly 
limited the roles of doctors, nurses and assistants. The 1910 Regulations 
for the Canadian Medical Service stated unequivocally that its officers 
were to focus on "the preservation of the health or comfort of the troops, 
and to the mitigation or prevention of disease in the army."2 There was 
no mention of missionary, outreach or public relations work, nor would 
there be in subsequent statements of doctrine. The 1959 Manual of the 
Canadian Forces Medical Service in the Field stated just as clearly that 
"The role of the Canadian Forces Medical Service in a theatre of 
operations is to conserve manpower,"3 while almost two decades later a 
Canadian Forces Medical Services Information Booklet insisted that 
"The Mission of the CFMS is the conservation of personnel to support 
the military operation through the prevention and treatment of disease 
and injury."4 
The reader will note the operative words in these statements of the 
military medical practitioner's role. The "health or comfort of the troops," 
1 Medical and Surgical History of the Canadian North-west Rebellion, (Montreal: Printed by J. 
Lovell and Sons, 1886), 42. 
2 Canada, Department of Militia and Defence, Regulations/or the Canadian Medical Service, 1910 
(Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1910), 7. 
3 Canada, Department of National Defence, Manual of the Canadian Forces Medical Service in 
the Field, 1959 (Ottawa: [Queen's Printer, 1959]), 1. 
4 Surgeon General, Canadian Forces Medical Services Information Booklet (Ottawa: National 
Defence Headquarters, 1977), 4. 
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"to conserve manpower," and "to support the military operation," obvi-
ously limit what doctors, nurses and medical assistants were expected to 
do. But health care work following Batoche just as clearly exemplifies the 
fact that that policy was not carved in stone, and is not a reliable reflection 
of historical events. Still, army official histories have focused on that 
institution's purely military role in the two world conflicts and Korea; 
naval official histories published to date have followed a similar path. The 
official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) provides some-
thing of an exception, dedicating a substantial amount of space in its 
second volume to surveying and similar cartographic missions of the 
interwar period. More popular histories have studied, in the main, institu-
tional development and the types of military operation those institutions 
considered to be of primary interest.5 For a comprehensive treatment of 
humanitarian relief operations, one needs to look to more specialized 
accounts, such as In the Line of Duty, an anthology of articles on opera-
tions in Somalia, many of which were humanitarian in nature, and Larry 
Milberry's Air Transport in Canada, which devotes one of fifty-three 
chapters to the issue. These two works are, however, exceptions to a 
general rule. Historians and other researchers have focused on what policy 
makers and the armed services themselves have considered to be, perhaps 
understandably, their main role: national defence. 
Still, there is much those who are interested in the history of medical 
practice can learn from studying lower priority missions. To come to grips 
with this area of activity it is necessary to study in some detail what 
medical practitioners actually did—to reach some understanding of events 
as they occurred and not how policy makers wished them to occur. The 
result, a look at what we could call "non-doctrinal operations," can help us 
understand how the role of armed forces is not limited to the military 
sphere, and how medical practitioners sometimes adapt and alter proce-
dures to fit that reality. 
The Early Cold War 
This paper focuses on the decades following the Second World War, 
since it was in that period that humanitarian relief operations took on a 
noted international flavour. In the decades following Batoche, medical 
practitioners overseas did indeed focus on supporting wartime military 
5 Such works include John Marteinson's We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated History of the 
Canadian Army (though there is passing reference to humanitarian relief on p.391), J. L. Granatstein's 
Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace, Marc Milner's Canada's Navy: The First 
Century, and a variety of general air force histories, notably Larry Milberry's multi-volume Canada's 
Air Force at War and Peace (though there is some mention of medical evacuations in the first two 
volumes, and a promise to discuss humanitarian relief in more detail in the two volumes yet to come). 
82 Bill Rawling 
operations, for instance in the South African War of 1899-1902 and the 
two world wars. In the peace that followed, however, Canada's armed 
services were, for the first time in appreciable numbers, deployed over-
seas in the absence of military conflict. After a few years of demobili-
zation following victory in Europe and the Pacific, Canada's armed 
services began once again to prepare for war. Though much has been 
claimed for the importance of Igor Gouzenko's 1945 defection in rais-
ing Canadian apprehensions concerning the international designs of 
communist countries, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia had far more 
impact on Canadian policy making. Defence budgets began to increase 
that very year, and expanded dramatically after North Korea's invasion 
of its southern neighbour in 1950. By the time the 1953 armistice was 
signed, Canada's spending on things military had increased nine-fold. 
In a simultaneous development, Canada also sought to play a role in 
ensuring Cold War protagonists did not enter into a major conflict as the 
result of an escalation of some smaller war. Also, as a country that never 
had been—and never would be—a major power, it attempted to work 
through international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO 
to see that its national interests were not overwhelmed by the world's most 
powerful nations. Linked with this move to get a seat at the table of 
international discussion was a willingness to finance various international 
agencies. Another result of these varied stimuli was Canada's peacekeep-
ing operations, such as the force sent to observe the ceasefire between 
Israel and some of its Arab neighbours in 1948, or the group sent to help 
manage the ceasefire between India and Pakistan the following year. 
Department of National Defence (DND) documents relating to medi-
cal issues of the time therefore focus on the support provided to these 
peacekeeping and similar operations following various conflicts in such 
places as the Middle East, South Asia, Indochina, and Cyprus. Some-
what unexpectedly, however, overseas commitments were not all the 
result of war; many missions were straightforward assistance opera-
tions. One of the first humanitarian operations of thé post-war era to 
enter the documentary record was the provision of aid to the Nether-
lands during severe flooding in February 1953. Though no medical 
personnel were sent, it nonetheless demonstrates how the military chain 
of command could react to a humanitarian crisis. When the issue came 
up of involving 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, which was 
posted to Germany as part of Canada's NATO contribution, the Cana-
dian Ambassador to the Hague noted that "We are naturally in dark" as 
to how to proceed.6 Red tape proved not to be a problem, however* as 
6 National Archives of Canada (NA), RG 24,83-84/167, Box 6548,2-13-3, Cdn Ambassador The 
Hague to S/State External Affairs, 2 Feb 53. 
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the ambassador announced the very next day that a troop of 30 men 
from the brigade's engineer squadron had left for Holland to "act as 
emergency boatcrew."7 Given that the operation did not involve the use 
of force, it was in effect the equivalent of a training exercise and was 
thus well within a commander's sphere of authority to launch. 
The turnaround for providing support in an emergency was not al-
ways so quick. When in November 1955 the Under-Secretary of State 
for External Affairs requested one or two RCAF aircraft to airlift 
supplies to flood-ravaged parts of Pakistan and India, it took almost two 
weeks for the air force to rearrange its schedules in order to comply.8 
Still, the issue was more one of making the necessary logistical arrange-
ments than sorting out lines of authority and policy. When in 1960 Chile 
was struck by an earthquake, an RCAF North Star aircraft left Trenton 
soon after with, among other things, 2000 vials of tetanus antitoxin, 500 
vials of anti-gangrene serum, and 28 000 vials of penicillin.9 In each of 
the above cases the mission was of short duration and required little in 
the way of personnel. 
As for the medical branches, some of the requests they received were of 
the type that might have been more familiar to missionary societies. For 
example, in 1962 the Surgeon-General reported to the Canadian Forces 
Medical Council that "because of the attrition in the United Kingdom 
Medical Services they could not meet certain overseas commitments and 
requested that Canada provide one internist, one surgeon, one obstetri-
cian/gynaecologist and one anaesthetist for the military hospital at Accra, 
Ghana," which served civilian as well as military needs. The Canadian 
Forces Medical Service already had a medical officer (or MO) serving 
there, but expanding that contribution was unlikely. "As there is a shortage 
of medical officers and specialists in the Canadian Forces Medical Service, 
any additional commitments of this nature will be extremely difficult to 
meet. Accordingly, authority has been requested from the Chairman, 
Chiefs of Staff to promulgate information to Reserve medical officers and 
ask for names of volunteers. Authority has also been requested to advise 
the Deans of Medical Schools in Canada of the potential requirement, in 
order that they may circulate their medical staffs and advise any interested 
individuals to apply." Willing volunteers could take courses in tropical 
medicine at either Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue, in Quebec, or the London 
School of Tropical Medicine.10 Significantly, no member of the Canadian 
7 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 6548,2-13-3, Cdn Ambassador The Hague to FRG, 3 Feb 53. 
8 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 6548, 2-13-3, Jules Léger to F. R. Miller, DM DND, 15 Nov 55; 
W/C G. Broadley for CAS, to Under S/State for External Affairs, 28 Nov 55. 
9 Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) 75/351, Canadian 
Red Cross News Service, 28 May 60. 
10 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7789, 2-6030-110/M1-1, pt 7,24th Meeting CFMC, 11 May 62. 
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Forces Medical Council noted why they were entertaining such requests, 
but hints at an explanation would surface in the years that followed. 
The CFMS officer already in Ghana serves as an excellent example 
of how the military could operate in a wider campaign of western-
ization. He reported in May 1962 how he had arrived in December 1961 
"to find a completely new and very well equipped Laboratory." Perhaps 
typically, however, simply importing equipment without implementing 
a local training program proved counter-productive. "Much of the 
equipment was beyond the comprehension of even the most experi-
enced technician," Captain R. W. W. Kay related, "and during the 
re-organization period preceeding this date there had been very little 
training and upgrading of Laboratory Technicians. In addition, reor-
ganization of administration and the large inventory resulting from the 
equipment expansion required that for the first time since the Hospital 
started an administrative side had to be formed in the Laboratory." 
Certain forms of aid might therefore be more complicated than they 
were worth, and Kay found that though eight technicians operated the 
laboratory, and though "their zeal for work was high," there was no 
reserve to allow for some sort of rotation, so they could not be taken 
away from the benches for training. Furthermore, in a circular phe-
nomenon that would become common in medical humanitarian aid, 
providing medical services increased demand for those same services. 
According to Kay, "the Hospital commitments were increasing due to 
the accepting of civilians as entitled patients, to the expansion of the 
Ghana Armed Forces to include Air Force and Naval personnel. Most of 
all however, the expansion was due to the fact that 'European Medicine' 
had at last been 'sold' to the Army personnel."11 Missionary zeal had 
paid off in the form of acceptance, at the cost of severely straining the 
services being provided, as was the case in the laboratory described 
above. 
Across the continent from Ghana was Tanzania, where Canada main-
tained a military aid mission in the 1960s, complete with a medical 
officer to look after the health needs of Canadian troops. A few months 
after deployment, however, Flight Lieutenant W. J. O'Hara was report-
ing that his mornings were mostly taken up accompanying a Tanzanian 
medical officer, Captain Chuwa, on sick parade. The ailments he en-
countered among Tanzanian soldiers included some quite common 
among Canadian troops, such as venereal disease, others only seen in 
overseas deployments, such as malaria, and some unheard of in Cana-
dian soldiers, such as leprosy. Part of the programme he supported 
11 NA, RG 24,83-84/167, Box 7849,2-6160-034/121, Capt R. W. W. Kay, RAMC, Annual Report 
and End of Tour Report, 1962,23 May 63. 
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consisted of sending candidates to Canada to train as pilots, but con-
ducting medicals for these men often proved frustratingly different 
from the same process back home when those with the necessary educa-
tional qualifications had to be turned away on medical grounds. Fifty to 
eighty per cent of these potential recruits had heart murmurs, probably 
due to childhood bouts of rheumatic fever.12 Attempting to apply the 
health standards of an industrialized state to an African nation in transi-
tion would lead to many such discoveries. 
One difficulty encountered in Tanzania, also seen in the deployment 
to Ghana, was that demands could be limitless. The responsibilities of 
medical practitioners did not end when they had dealt with military 
needs, but were extended to families as well. In one five-day visit to the 
5th Battalion, for instance, "two cases of paralytic polio had just turned 
up. Also several children had died from whooping cough since our last 
visit. I was quite surprised to find that Capt Chuwa had neglected to 
immunize the dependent children because 'there is no polio here5. 
Immediate action was taken to get adequate polio vaccine to Tabora so 
that all dependents could be immunized."13 
In fact, this expansion of medical services provided by the military 
was not limited to aid missions. A similar expansion was occuring in 
Canada, where soldiers, sailors, and air personnel no longer joined up 
for the duration of a conflict but foresaw, in many cases, making a 
decades-long career in one of the country's fighting services. They 
would not do so if the impact on their families was too harsh, so as early 
as the late 1940s many military medical practitioners had to apply 
knowledge in such specialties as obstetrics. In some communities, such 
as Fort Nelson, British Columbia,14 and Churchill, Manitoba,15 medical 
detachments treated residents of the area as well as service personnel 
and their families. For O'Hara to work among civilians in Tanzania was 
thus not unusual, and in one of his reports he presented an excellent 
example of the relationship between soldiers' health and the community 
in which they lived. "My own efforts to launch a cleanup campaign for 
the serious VD problem in TPDF [Tanzanian People's Defence Forces] 
has met failure. Social pressures, moral lethargy and ignorance are all 
contributing factors."16 (Medical practitioners engaged in the fight 
against AIDS three decades later would report in like fashion.) 
12 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7849,2-6160-034/311, F/L W. J. O'Hara, Med/MO, to SG, 6 Apr 
66. 
13 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7849,2-6160-034/311, F/L W. J. O'Hara to SG, 16 Jul 66. 
14 R. G. Foulkes, "Medics in the North," Medical Services Journal Canada (July-August 1962): 
524, 538; (October 1962): 676; (November 1962): 750. 
15 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7789, 2-6030-110/M1-1, pt 7, Minutes of a Meeting Held in the 
Office of the Minister of National Defence, 24 Mar 60. 
16 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7849, 2-6160-034/311, F/L W. J. O'Hara to SG, 16 Jul 66. 
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Other attempts to apply Canadian procedures and products in Tanza-
nia also met with disappointment. For instance, O'Hara noted the inade-
quacy of the vitamins: "The inter-service vitamins found in all first aid 
kits sent here cannot be used. The heat and humidity must be responsi-
ble for giving the pills such an offensive odour and taste that they 
cannot be consumed. As well they are all melted together and it is 
almost impossible to get the empty plastic container free of the stains 
and odour."17 
O'Hara's deployment was thus a mix of challenges both familiar and 
new. One problem the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces faced that 
was identical with one within the Canadian armed services was a short-
age of medical personnel, mainly because in the latter case better oppor-
tunities—and better remuneration—were available elsewhere. In spite 
of a wide variety of schemes which paid for medical education in return 
for a period of service later on or put members of the military through 
school, Canada's army, navy, and air force were perpetually short of 
qualified people.18 Similarly, the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces 
were having little luck recruiting doctors. "For the next two years it 
does not appear that there will be any additional MOs in the army. 
Medical students interviewed recently in Uganda by Dr Chuwa, were 
not interested in army life at all, and secondarily were not impressed 
with the salary." Further, "In general, our present small group of Army 
'medical assistants' are very poorly trained, inadequate and incompe-
tent but not because of lack of potential, interest or ability but because 
good medical training facilities are almost impossible to come by." 
O'Hara suggested that Canada take on responsibility for such educa-
tion, making sure to align his plan with the priorities of the Cold War by 
reporting that "The Chinese have built and equipped an army medical 
centre in Zanzibar recently, as well as staffing it with at least three 
medical specialists."19 
Canada thus had a competitor for the gratitude of the Tanzanian 
people, and therein lies an explanation for such missionary work. In the 
same way that religious organizations used Western medicine as a 
means of making contact with people in Asia and Africa so as to convert 
them to Christianity, so did the liberal democracies send medical prac-
titioners to convince those who had recently gained political inde-
pendence to join forces with their erstwhile masters in the Cold War 
against communism. As military historian Andrew Godefroy explains, 
17 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7849,2-6160-034/311, F/L W. J. O'Hara to SG, Oct 66. 
18 For example: NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7717, 20-1-1, pt 3, A/C F. G. Wait, Chair Ad Hoc 
Ctee, to Sec PMC, 9 May 51; NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7719, 20-1-1, pt 18, Surg RAdm T. B. 
McLean, SG, Supporting Data for PMC, 23 Mar 60. 
19 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7849,2-6160-034/311, F/L W. J. O'Hara to SG, Oct 66. 
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"Canadian Participation in military assistance programs began in the 
late 1950s as officials in the Department of External Affairs (DEA) 
realized the increasing value of such aid in contribution towards the 
pro-democratic evolution of the developing world,"20 or at least to-
wards the anti-communist evolution of those recently independent na-
tions. As for Ghana and Tanzania more specifically, Canadian missions 
there (both civilian and military) were to help encourage those govern-
ments to "firmly support a pro-Western rather than communist regime 
in the two countries."21 
Although competing political ideologies may have motivated the 
military medical aid missions, the good doctor in Tanzania seemed 
more concerned with competing medical ideologies. He wrote, "The 
witchdoctors still lead an active role here. Recently I had a TPDF pilot, 
trained in Canada, request to see his 'local doctor.' He had been sick 
with undulant [or fluctuating] fever for about one week, when he wrote 
a letter to me from his hospital bed. He stated that he was suffering from 
a disease unknown to modern medicine and that only 'local doctors' 
could sucessfully treat it. He wanted me to authorize two weeks sick 
leave in order to go home and get this treatment." Within twenty-four 
hours of writing the letter, however, a combination of three antibiotics 
prescribed to treat Brucellosis "had finally worked, and he was dis-
charged from hospital, 'cured by modern medicine' ... he still 
sheepishly smiles whenever I mention the letter."22 Such gloating may 
seem rather inappropriate today, but we can perhaps consider the medi-
cal officer's isolation, distance from home, and frustration in attempt-
ing to inaugurate public health procedures as mitigating factors. Even in 
the midst of the Cold War, a doctor trained in Western medicine might 
find a local medical practitioner to be a more tangible threat than that 
posed by a Chinese hospital. 
By the mid-1960s, therefore, Canada's armed services had a decade's 
worth of experience engaging in non-doctrinal operations, while vari-
ous civilian agencies at home, one of them the Emergency Measures 
Organization, also learned much about humanitarian relief. Through 
such work within Canada, such as following a tidal wave at Alberni in 
1961, a forest fire in Prince Edward Island in 1964, an explosion in La 
Salle in 1965, and a Red River flood, also in 1965, civilian agencies 
learned a lesson that would have important implications for Canada's 
armed services. This lesson was the advantage of "the use of trained 
20 Andrew Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania 
1965-1970," Canadian Military History (Summer 2002): 32. 
21 Ibid., 31. 
22 NA, RG 24, 83-84/167, Box 7849, 2-6160-034/311, F/L W. J. O'Hara to SG, 19 May 67. 
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personnel over benevolent volunteers, who had, in fact, hindered rescue 
operations."23 "Trained personnel" could well include members of the 
army, navy, and air force, and when in 1966 the Emergency Measures 
Organization met for the first time as a committee, two of its eighteen 
members were from the services.24 Although the Department of Na-
tional Defence was clearly willing to help out in humanitarian relief on 
an ad hoc basis, it did not want such a role institutionalized. Its view 
was encapsulated in a report of November 1966: "In view of the DND 
position not to expend funds making special preparations for assistance 
to the civil authorities, the results of disaster research will have little 
effect on DND plans."25 Similarly, that same month E. B. Armstrong, 
the department's deputy minister, stated that "In a peacetime disaster 
situation the Canadian Forces are prepared to provide their resources in 
any type of disaster where civil capability clearly requires augmentation 
to alleviate human suffering or property damage... The ability to carry 
out the above assistance to civil authorities is based on military trained 
personnel and the employment of available DND equipment and vehi-
cles. No special training is carried out nor is expenditure of defence 
funds made for special equipment to carry out this task."26 
One example of how the Armed Forces expected to apply such a 
doctrine was in the wake of the Peruvian earthquake of late spring, 
1970. By mid-June about seventy members of the forces were in the 
disaster zone, and by the end of the month 424 (City of Hamilton) 
Squadron would fly ninety-seven relief missions for a total of 382 hours 
"over difficult and treacherous mountain passes." It also evacuated 
1903 injured and homeless Peruvians.27 One member of the team was 
Captain Ben Pasicov, a medical officer whose role was to see to the 
health and tend the injuries of the other members of the squadron, but in 
a development now well-familiar, he did not limit his work to what may 
have been written down in terms of reference. When on 17 June he was 
asked to treat a Peruvian who had been injured in the mountains, he 
accepted. "The journey began with a flight by American helicopter," a 
public relations officer reported, though the doctor was aware that three 
such aircraft had been lost in the previous three days in the canyon's 
treacherous downdrafts. Deposited safely on a grassy knoll ten miles 
23 NA, RG 24, 83-84/232, Box 41, 1150-110/J25, Summary Record of EMO Study Group on 
Peacetime Disasters, 13-14 Oct 65. 
24 NA, RG 24, 83-84/232, Box 41, 1150-110/J25, Canada Emergency Measures Organization, 
Summary Record of First Meeting, 8 Jul 66. 
25 NA, RG 24, 83-84/232, Box 41, 1150-110/J25, Col T. R. McCoy, DSEO, to DC Res, 22 Nov 
66. 
26 NA, RG 24, 83-84/232, Box 41,1150-110/J25, E. B. Armstrong, DM, to Canadian Emergency 
Measures Organization, 30 Nov 66. 
27 DHH 72/293, Department of National Defence, Information Services, 29 Jun 70. 
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further up the valley—and another thousand feet up in the mountain 
air—two guides were waiting "and together the foursome trudged along 
for about an hour climbing steadily all the way. 'A little further up,' the 
guides kept repeating as sister Guadelupe Zabaco of Madonna House, 
Cambermere, Ontario patiently translated... The light fails fast in the 
Huaylas Canyon when the sun goes down at 4.30 p.m. Unless they got 
there soon—and it was now almost noon—the doctor would be stranded 
without blankets and with no warm clothes in the subfreezing night of 
the mountains."28 Arriving at a village, he requested a horse for himself 
and a burro for the sister, though "It was then I learned the meaning of 
fear," when he realized that "my life depended upon an aging nag 
feeling its unsteady way along a ledge where a fall meant certain death." 
He was honest enough to report, however, that he seemed to be the only 
member of the party to be so concerned. Locating their patient, an 
elderly man who had been injured in a fall, they found that his left ankle 
and thigh had been broken, as were some ribs which had punctured and 
collapsed his lung. Treatment consisted of bamboo splints and pain 
relievers, and the small group then made its way back to the helicopter. 
Though RCAF medical officers, especially those who had worked in 
Canada's northern areas, were well-versed in treating civilian patients, 
Pasicov's experience was in a league of its own. 
The Latter Cold War 
By the early 1970s the Canadian Armed Forces were relying on what-
ever resources were available at the time—and on the initiative of those 
on the ground—to answer requests for humanitarian relief and similar 
operations. After providing aid in the aftermath of the Peruvian earth-
quake, other such missions included support to victims of flooding in 
Pakistan in 1970, of the war in Bangladesh in 1971, of an earthquake in 
Nicaragua in 1972, of famine in Niger in 1973, of hurricane and flood-
ing in Haiti in 1974, and of an earthquake in Honduras, also in 1974.29 
Then came Operation Dolomite. In the early days of May 1976, an 
earthquake struck Italy, and Canadian Forces Europe was directed to 
send an assistance team to aid that country in earthquake relief opera-
tions. A task force formed from units of 4 Canadian Mechanized Bri-
gade Group in Germany would establish a self-sufficient base within 
the damaged area to provide medical and other aid "as requested." The 
directive stated that although "The task force mission should in no way 
degrade" the operational capacity of Canadian Forces Europe, "The 
28 DHH 72/293, Fry to Gen Bourgeois, 23 Jun 70. 
29 DHH 79/461, Maj Mackay, Request for Information, 7 Apr 74. 
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task force must be highly visible and indicative of CAF [Canadian 
Armed Forces] expertise and humanitarian concerns." Italy being a 
fellow member of NATO, relief operations would help remind its peo-
ple whose side they were on in the Cold War. Unlike the deployment to 
Peru six years before, Dolomite was underpinned by clear geopolitical 
considerations. 
Orders having been issued on 7 May, medical practitioners were on 
the ground in Italy by the 10th. Clearly this type of operation was new 
to NATO: the situation on the ground was somewhat chaotic, not only 
because of the recent earthquake but due to the variety and number of 
organizations providing help. A question that came up at one briefing 
was, "As a large quantity of typhoid vaccine was sent to operational] 
area is an immunization program being carried out?" There was no 
immediate answer. Still, by the 11th it could be reported that, for the 
village of Pioverno, "A tented camp has been erected to provide food 
preparation, water, shelter, and med[ical] assistance." Also, Canadian 
personnel had finished "deploying tents, beds and kitchens in San 
Daniele" in support of a local hospital.30 The latter would be an impor-
tant focus for medical work for the remainder of the mission. 
Though by the 12th, "Generally it would appear that the initial 
emergency situation is over," that merely meant that the task force had 
a better idea of just what would be required. Medical assistance would 
continue to be a priority, as would engineer support to fire brigades and 
the provision of food and shelter. Five patients arrived at San Daniele 
that day, and a request went out for a medical officer, four medical 
assistants and two ambulances; it was accepted. At nearby Venzone a 
medical officer, three medical assistants and two ambulances trans-
ported patients to facilities undamaged by the quake. With the local 
health situation now clearer, the Command Surgeon advised that per-
sonnel joining the task force would need booster shots for typhus and 
other diseases. Operations were, therefore, settling into a routine, in-
cluding the report that "Mrs Margarita Perisano, the first patient in the 
San Daniele hospital Operating Room which had just been set up by 
Cdn personnel, gave birth to her seventh child, a 7.2 lb girl." She was 
one of thirty-three patients treated that day by an organization at San 
Daniele that included a medical officer, four medical assistants and 
forty-eight other personnel from various armed forces trades, on site "to 
assist Italian Medical Authorities."31 
30 DHH, 77/216, Annex B, Commander CFE, 7 May 76; Annex D, Minutes of Briefing in CFE Ops 
Centre, 10 May 76; Annex E, Minutes of Briefing in CFE Ops Centre, 11 May 76. 
31 DHH, 77/216, Annex G, Minutes of Briefing in CFE Ops Centre, 12 May 76; Annex H, Minutes 
of Briefing in CFE Ops Centre, 13 May 76. 
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One should note, however, that the confusion that had accompanied 
the initial deployment did not entirely disappear as operations normal-
ized. On the 14th the Command Surgeon noted that he had received an 
indent "for special drugs." Not knowing exactly what they were for, he 
could only provide an educated guess that "this must be for hospital 
patients." Similarly, the Chief of Staff to the Base Commander asked: 
"Could we get some clarification on French use of vaccines in Ven-
zone," since "French officer has requested innoculation for 120," 
though the location and function of that contingent was something of a 
mystery. Information like "Some med persons seen" was not particu-
larly helpful in that regard. Also, "The US have formed a special 
medical evaluation team under the authority of the Vice-President pre-
pared 'to recommend provision of med supplies to national contin-
gents'," though that was not much clearer than French intentions. The 
Canadians, therefore, though part of a NATO deployment, quite ration-
ally focused on their own operations, which that day saw patients 
treated in the aid station in Venzone while three ambulances provided 
medical support to engineering operations in that area. At San Daniele, 
a section transported furniture and hospital equipment while another 
assisted in the erection of a field hospital.32 
In keeping with the fact that Operation Dolomite was a NATO deploy-
ment, instructions had been issued that it was not to degrade the capabili-
ties of Canadian Forces Europe, whose primary responsibility was to 
defend against a Warsaw Pact invasion. The contingent's commander, 
therefore, "questioned the use of Canadian medical supplies and vaccine in 
the area. He then gave direction to have Italian authorities contacted and 
requested to supply appropriate medical supplies..." There seemed to be no 
objections, and by the 18th, a week after arrival, the Commander Canadian 
Forces Europe could advise Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Moore, the com-
mander of the Canadians in Italy, that "The situation is stabilizing and the 
time is approaching when the Italian authorities will begin to implement 
long term reconstruction plans. Your Task Force therefore can be with-
drawn as your assistance is replaced by that provided by the local authori-
ties." Furthermore, "A great deal of the consultation with the Italian 
authorities was completed by the Comd Surg and the S SO CE earlier this 
week,"33 the latter two being the Command Surgeon and the Senior Staff 
Officer Construction Engineering. 
Ongoing tasks included providing hospital tentage and non-medical 
hospital support services at San Daniele, while the main body at Ven-
32 DHH, 77/216, Annex J, Minutes of Briefing in CFE Ops Centre, 14 May 76. 
33 DHH, 77/216, Annex K, Minutes of Briefing in CFE Ops Centre, 15 May 76; Annex M, SDO 
Briefing, 16 May 76; Annex P, Operation Instruction 02, 18 May 76. 
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zone focused, medically, on immunization, providing essential pharma-
ceutical supplies not otherwise available, and giving advice on hygiene 
and sanitation. Looking to the future at San Daniele, "the medical 
superintendent of this hospital was emphatic that the Canadian contri-
bution of men and tentage was and will be essential to his continuing 
operation, until his patients can be otherwise housed." The surgeon and 
engineer agreed, at least in part, recommending that "Canadian tentage 
should remain in use by the San Daniele hospital until replaced in two 
to three weeks. A small Canadian supervisory Detachment will con-
tinue to be required after the gradual reduction of the present strength. 
There is no viable task for Canadian medical personnel at San Daniele." 
There was, therefore, little left to do medically, especially since "The 
mayor of Venzone states that almost all required civilian immunization 
is now complete."34 It was time to leave, the main body heading for 
Germany on 3 IMay. Brigadier General Belzile, the Acting Commander 
for Canadian Forces Europe, commented on "the professional manner 
in which the CFE/BASE staff have handled Op Dolomite. It has given a 
further opportunity for a real test for the operations centres and sections 
to do the very thing they are designed to perform."35 
Not exactly: though all Canadians involved, including members of 4 
Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group as well as Base units and Cana-
dian Forces Europe, had performed effectively, Dolomite had not been 
"the very thing" they had been designed for. The Brigade Group espe-
cially had a more martial purpose, which was to help defend NATO's 
central area against an invasion by the Warsaw Pact; more specifically, 
it was a reserve force for either VII (US) or II (German) Corps, most 
likely the latter. Furthermore, the brigade was in something of a logisti-
cal limbo at the time of Dolomite. It had moved away from the northern 
area of Germany, where it had been part of the British Army of the 
Rhine's supply line, further south to where US forces were responsible 
for its materiel.36 Though launched with a political objective in 
mind—matériel solidarity—Dolomite nonetheless had an important al-
truistic dimension to it, as Canadian medical practitioners doled out 
vaccines and other supplies they could replace only with difficulty. 
A similar operation, called Abalone, was conducted a few years later. 
In the early part of April 1979, the Caribbean nation of St. Vincent 
34 DHH, 77/216, Annex P, LCol H. R. Bohne, SSO CE, Report on Visit to Udine Area 16/17 May 
76 by Surg CFE and SSO CE, 18 May 76. 
35 DHH, 77/216, Annex T, Minutes of Briefing in CFE Ops Centre, 22 May 76; Annex V, SDO 
Briefing, 24 May 76; SDO Briefing, 25 May 76; SDO Briefing, 27 May 76; Minutes of Briefing in CFE 
Ops Centre, 31 May 76. 
36 Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-J993 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997), 291,294-95. 
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experienced several volcanic eruptions necessitating the evacuation of 
upwards of fifteen thousand people to some sixty or seventy refugee 
camps in the southern part of the island. A thirteen-member medical 
team from 2 Field Ambulance, SSF, or Special Service Force, was 
dispatched to render aid,37 though in contrast with Dolomite it was not 
encapsulated within the framework of a military alliance or similar 
organization. Perhaps for that reason, the detachment's commander, 
Captain D. Tyrrell, had to "obtain verbal authority to practice medicine 
in St. Vincent on emergency basis," since neither he nor any member of 
his team was licensed in that country. Similar to the instructions given 
for Dolomite, he was to "avoid committal of further aid from Canada 
without permission of Ottawa," as military medical resources were 
somewhat limited.38 
A key player in the work that followed was Master Corporal Naylor, 
a Preventive Medicine Technician, who "was extremely useful in in-
specting and advising on health measures within the evacuation centres, 
namely, over sixty centres providing food and shelter for 15 to 20 000 
people. These reports dealt essentially with sewage disposal, food han-
dling, and garbage disposal. These recommendations were passed on to 
the Central Medical Committee for further action." However, as Kay 
discovered in Ghana and O'Hara found in Tanzania, deployments to 
other parts of the world provided lessons that had to be learned the hard 
way, such as the inappropriateness of the food (called an Individual 
Ration Pack, or IRP) the medical team brought for its own consump-
tion. "These menus were found to be similar in make-up and were felt 
to supply too heavy a meal for tropical climates. In the tropics, the 
calorie intake required per day/per man is approximately 2 000 calories, 
the menus supplied a minimum of 5 000 calories." One can speculate 
that the rations were a consequence of Canada's focus on defending 
western Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion, rather than on deploy-
ments to areas closer to the equator. Similarly, "It was quite evident that 
a careful and supervised period of climatization had to be carried out in 
this type of climate. Sunburn, to the extent of incapacitating a soldier, is 
a definite risk as well as heat stroke and heat exhaustion." 39 
Humanitarian relief could thus present health challenges similar to 
those of the peacekeeping operations of the time or large-scale training 
exercises, and that the Canadian Forces Medical Service was learning 
from its experiences was, institutionally, all to the good. Abalone dif-
fered, however, from operations in Ghana, Tanzania, and Italy—like the 
37 DHH, Annual Historical Reports, 2104, Operation Abalone, Post Operation Report. 
38 DHH, Annual Historical Reports, 2104, Operation Abalone, Post Operation Report. 
39 DHH, Annual Historical Reports, 2104, Operation Abalone, Post Operation Report. 
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operations in Peru it seemed to have no direct link with the Cold War. 
Still, Department of National Defence policy remained generally con-
sistent. "While we do not maintain specialist personnel designated 
specifically for humanitarian relief, we do provide support where possi-
ble. Depending upon the degree of urgency and nature of support re-
quested, armed forces personnel can be expected to move within 48 
hours of receipt of a request."40 After the 1991 break-up of the Soviet 
Union, however, such "requests" would be far from uncommon, and for 
a brief period, until it was disbanded in 1993, 4 Canadian Mechanized 
Brigade Group in Germany served as a base and a pool to respond to 
them. Whereas in the period spanning from the end of the Second 
World War to the attempted coup against Gorbachev Canadian opera-
tions overseas focused mainly on supporting NATO or peacekeeping/ 
observer missions in such places as Kashmir, the Middle East and 
Cyprus, in the 1990s there was more emphasis than previously on 
humanitarian issues in such areas as the Balkans, central Africa and 
Kurdish parts of Turkey. Following the Gulf War, operations in Turkey 
were especially exemplary of how hazardous such missions had be-
come. In some instances, Turkish troops, no doubt confused as to why 
foreigners were helping the Kurdish minority as well as unwanted 
refugees from Iraq, harassed Canadian medical practitioners by point-
ing cocked weapons at them.41 
Perhaps even more dangerous was the mission to Somalia in 
1992-93. Though the deployment became prominent in the public eye 
because of the murder of a Somali teenager by Canadian troops, it is the 
more routine medical aspect of operations which is of greater interest to 
the present study. Unlike deployments to Ghana, Tanzania, Peru, Italy, 
St. Vincent and other regions in previous decades, the troops sent to 
Somalia were not soldiers engaged in humanitarian relief operations, 
but involved in a military deployment of which aid was merely a 
component. Orders were that "the Canadian Joint Forces Somalia will 
provide, as part of the multinational United Task Force, the secure 
environment for the distribution of relief supplies in Somalia," the word 
"secure" explicitly referring to the use of armed force. HMCS Pre-
server, for example, a 20 000-ton replenishment vessel with, among 
other things, the capability to perform surgery, not only used its heli-
copters to evacuate victims of snake bite, vehicle accidents and gunshot 
wounds, but on one occasion to prevent a Red Cross coastal vessel from 
being attacked by Somali clansmen. Furthermore, medical and health 
operations were provided further depth by the presence of engineering 
40 DHH 79/461, Briefing Notes on CF Participation in International Relief Operations, May 79. 
41 Sean Maloney, War Without Battles, 460-61. 
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teams who could, in one instance, install generators, air conditioners, 
X-ray facilities and various surgical equipment in the Medina hospital 
in the south end of Mogadishu. 
As in Ghana and Tanzania decades before, there was a missionary 
aspect to the provision of health care, though at the tactical rather than 
the strategic level. As Colonel J. L. Labbé, the Canadian contingent's 
commander, explained, in order to establish the "secure environment" 
called for in his orders, "first we had to earn the trust and confidence of 
the local population and their leaders." One means of achieving this was 
by having a large proportion of the fifty medical practitioners of the 
Canadian Airborne Regiment performing several days of volunteer 
work every week in the hospital at Belet Uen.42 Some of the lessons of 
previous deployments needed to be relearned, however, and the rations 
the Canadians had brought were not always appropriate in an Islamic 
society. According to one of the medical practitioners deployed to 
Somalia, "Food for all people in the camp took the form of IMPs or hard 
rations 'boil in a bag.' The Somalis ate what we did but we had to be 
careful about anything with pork products. Ever think how many Indi-
vidual) M(eal) P(ackage)s have possible pork products in them?—wie-
ners and beans, sausage and hash browns, ham omelette."43 In regards 
to rations, at least, Canada was still focused on NATO and western 
Europe rather than on other organizations working in other parts of the 
world. 
To the mundane could be added hazards that had been unheard of in 
previous missions. Canadians were operating in the midst of clan war-
fare where almost everyone was under arms, something Corporal Mario 
Charette could certainly attest to. "A medical assistant with the Cana-
dian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, Cpl Charette defused a violent 
demonstration of armed townspeople at the entrance to the Belet-[U]en 
Hospital on February 17, 1993," a citation for a decoration later stated. 
While surgeons were operating inside the building, "Cpl Charette was 
working alone when a crowd advanced towards the gates of the hospi-
tal. Shots were fired and a grenade exploded while Cpl Charette called 
for back-up. Despite the growing chaos, Cpl Charette continued to 
transmit situation reports while he screened and disarmed the demon-
strators. His efforts prevented further destruction of the hospital and the 
possible deaths of many people." He received the Medal of Bravery in 
June 1994. 
42 In the Line of Duty: Canadian Joint Forces Somalia, 1992-1993 (Ottawa: National Defence, 
1994), 60, 104, 115,266. 
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Humanitarianism Institutionalized 
As we have seen, up to the time of the deployment to Somalia the 
Canadian Armed Forces had considered humanitarian relief to be some-
what exceptional to the Medical Service's main role, which was to 
support military operations. The exceptional became institutionalized 
in 1994 with a Defence White Paper mandating a humanitarian assis-
tance mission for the Canadian Armed Forces as a whole. Whereas the 
1987 version had had headings for "Strategic Deterrence," "Conven-
tional Defence," "Sovereignty," "Peacekeeping," and "Arms Control," 
with no mention of humanitarian relief,44 seven years later there was a 
noticeable change in emphasis: "UN peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations are playing a critical role in responding to the immediate 
consequences, both direct and indirect, of global population and re-
source pressures. Armed forces are being called upon increasingly to 
ensure a safe environment for the protection of refugees, the delivery of 
food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in 
countries where civil society has collapsed."45 Justification, though 
unsupported by evidence in the paper, was that "Canadians have a 
strong sense of responsibility to alleviate suffering and respond, where 
their efforts can make a difference."46 
The change in emphasis can be traced back to the early 1990s, the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, and the Progressive Conservative govern-
ment of Brian Mulroney. The Prime Minister suggested in 1991 that 
nation-states "rethink the limits of national sovereignty in a world 
where problems respect no borders," and the concept was adhered to 
with some consistency. Foreign Minister Barbara McDougall suggested 
in 1993 that "we have to re-consider the UN's traditional definition of 
state sovereignty." Individual rights, including to basics such as food 
and shelter, were beginning to rise in importance in comparison with 
the rights of state governments. The Liberal government of Jean 
Chrétien that was elected in 1993 maintained a similar focus, identify-
ing mass migration, epidemics, and other humanitarian tragedies as 
possible threats to Canadian security.47 
Another influence on policy may have been the fact that the country's 
fighting services had already carried out humanitarian relief work—and 
for some time. Within Canada, the 1994 White Paper noted, "The 
44 Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada 
(Ottawa: National Defence, 1987). 
45 Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: National Defence, 1994), 5. 
46 Ibid., 12. 
47 Greg Donaghy, "All God's Children: Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security and Canadian Foreign 
Policy," Canadian Foreign Policy (Winter 2003): 39-56. 
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Canadian Forces play a key role in responding to natural and manmade 
disasters. Not only is the Minister of National Defence also the Minister 
Responsible for Emergency Preparedness, but, as part of a broader 
initiative to reduce the size of government, the administration of emer-
gency preparedness planning—once carried out by a separate agency— 
has been absorbed by the Department of National Defence," which was 
tasked to "make an immediate and effective contribution to disaster 
relief."48 No longer would the armed forces occasionally answer the 
call for help—they would be the ones organizing assistance. Thus, in a 
list of six objectives for National Defence, the third was to "be prepared 
to contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 
hours, and sustain this effort for as long as necessary."49 Though pre-
sented under the rubric of "Protecting Canadians," and referring to 
disaster relief activities in Canada, the policy could just as easily apply 
to overseas deployments—and it was. 
The Disaster Assistance Response Team, or DART, was created in 
the mid-1990s. Its role was "to conduct international emergency hu-
manitarian assistance operations," and as such was expected "to deploy 
anywhere in the world within 48 hours." A typical mission was ex-
pected to last about ninety days. The response team would rely on 
personnel from other units to make up its establishment, Petawawa's 2 
Field Ambulance, for example, tasked to provide a platoon-plus of 
about thirty people to the organization.50 
Like the units sent to Somalia, the DART would be a full-fledged 
military organization complete with logistical support provided by the 
Central Medical Equipment Depot (CMED) in Petawawa. In 1998, for 
instance, CMED reported that it was maintaining seven days' worth of 
DART medical supplies, "in order to meet a 12-hour notice to move," 
with a second seven days' worth of medical materiel assembled and 
retained in its warehouse. When in November 1998 the devastation 
caused in Central America by Hurricane Mitch resulted in the first 
deployment of the DART (Operation Central), at CMED, "within four 
hours of receiving the request for this materiel, all stores were strapped 
to 80 pallets and loaded onto two tractor trailers, ready for shipment to 
awaiting aircraft at 8 Wing Trenton." Over the next few days CMED 
also ordered, received and loaded perishable medical supplies required 
for the deployment's second seven days. "During the remainder of Op 
Central CMED provided numerous IOR [Immediate Operational Re-
quirement] shipments of medical supplies to meet the unique, on-the-
48 DND, 1994 Defence White Paper, 18. 
49 Ibid., 19. 
50 DHH, Annual Historical Reports, 2104, For Year 1996. 
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ground requirements of the DART Medical Platoon."51 As far as the 
Depot was concerned, such stores were in good hands, since Master 
Seaman Johnston, Op Central's Primary Medical Storesperson, was one 
of the augmentées it relied upon to deploy—and he was normally a 
member of CMED.52 In August 1999 the DART was sent in similar 
fashion to Turkey to give humanitarian assistance to the victims of an 
earthquake, with CMED providing seven days' worth of medical stores 
immediately, then at intervals in the thirty-eight days the operation 
(called Torrent) lasted.53 
As for the members of the DART proper, one example of their field 
operations is worth describing in some detail, since it demonstrates the 
state of the art of humanitarian relief operations at that time. On 3 
November 1998, Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne Douglas, the unit's CO, 
received a call advising of the possibility that the DART would deploy 
to Central America. Later, word came that he would be part of a 
reconnaissance team led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, which would consider the feasibility of such a 
mission. The military element of the team would consist of Douglas, a 
medical liaison officer, a logistics liaison officer, and an engineer liai-
son officer. On 4 November these officers drew their personal weapons, 
among other preparations, only to be told by National Defence Head-
quarters that though fire-arms would be carried on the deployment, they 
would not be allowed on the reconnaissance. (The issue of weapons as 
a matter of routine is evidence that DART operations were not ad hoc 
affairs—they were military missions conducted according to pre-estab-
lished Standing Operating Procedures, or SOPs. We have already seen 
examples of this in Somalia, a mission which predated the 1994 White 
Paper.) Next day their aircraft landed in Managua, and on the 10th the 
first five chalks (or loads) of the DART arrived, with five more next 
day, another five on the 12th, the total personnel in theatre numbering 
286 on the 14th.54 
Events developed quickly thereafter, and the next day the medical 
facility saw its first patient, a young woman with a gunshot wound to 
the hip and hand. "Apparently they were the result of an argument with 
a neighbour over a chicken." The next patient was evidence that mem-
bers of the DART could themselves become casualties; a soldier, seri-
ously ill, was evacuated on the Minister of Defence's airbus, as the 
Minister happened to be touring the site at the time. The following day 
51 DHH 1326-1910, Central Medical Equipment Depot, Annual Historical Report, 3 May 99. 
52 DHH 1326-1910, Central Medical Equipment Depot, Annual Historical Report, 3 May 99. 
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was busier as medical assistance operations began in the Aguan Valley; 
they consisted of running a main clinic while sending Joint Medical 
Teams (JMTs) to more remote villages. The teams were made up of 
Canadian military personnel and anyone else, whether local medical 
practitioner or member of a non-governmental international organiza-
tion (NGO), with useful skills. They saw about one hundred patients at 
the main clinic and twice that number in one of the villages. They also 
began distributing water and medical supplies.55 
On the 17th, the DART's commander toured the clinic, located a half 
kilometre from a nearby village. Fifty or sixty people waited at the gate, 
where "Intake was on a modified number system. The clients were 
given a quick triage and any in immediate need were taken straight to 
the clinic. The rest were provided with numbers and were told to wait 
until called." Those in the latter group remained in a tent waiting area 
where an interpreter asked them basic questions about what was ailing 
them. From there they then went through an initial screening area where 
medical staff and an interpreter started a patient record and asked for 
yet more information. A third phase in the proceedings consisted of an 
examination area where they were seen by medical assistants and/or 
nurses. Finally, a doctor might conduct an examination and diagnosis, 
and if necessary issue a prescription, which could be filled by an onsite 
pharmacy. The clinic was soon looking at about one hundred patients a 
day, though these tended to be people from local communities suffering 
from chronic illnesses rather than those affected by the floods. To look 
after the latter, the medical company worked in concert with local 
medical personnel and others from the Standard Foods corporation, 
which owned and operated large swathes of farmland in the region. 
Medical teams were trucked out to outlying villages where they con-
ducted daily clinics, while helicopters were used to move Honduran 
medical teams to remote locations so they could conduct two-day clin-
ics, each of which saw 300 to 400 patients.56 
The organization was thus up and running, but three days later it 
became clear that the DART was approaching the limits of its capacity. 
Conversations with Ottawa solicited the reminder that "The normal 
DART mandate consists of the provision of water and medical aid. The 
DART can exploit excess capacity to assist in local improvements and 
to work through local initiatives. However, it should not take on pro-
jects that will require the long-term commitment of resources... Local 
people and NGOs...will be around long after we leave" and be in a 
position to deal with longer-term problems. (The reader will note that 
55 DHH, Op Central War Diary, 3914. 
56 DHH, Op Central War Diary, 3914. 
100 Bill Rawling 
there were similar policies in place at the time of Operation Dolomite in 
Italy.) A difficulty related to the above was that the unit had received no 
medical supplies from Canada, beyond its initial seven day allocation.57 
The reason for this is something of a mystery since, as we have seen, the 
medical equipment depots had been able to package and ship the listed 
materials; either the latter were insufficient to the task or, more likely, 
there was not enough air transport to move it to Honduras. If such was 
indeed the case, it might have posed a serious limit on the DART's 
capabilities, though through no fault of its own. 
Regardless of the cause, "Honduran and foreign aid workers have all 
expressed surprise at the small quantity of medicine which DART has 
contributed to its own operations. There is potential for Canada to be 
embarrassed by this situation, as supplies have been provided to DART 
JMTs by NGOs and by Standard Fruit Company of Honduras, the 
International Hospital for Children and the Robinson Foundation. These 
organizations are actively seeking sources of medicine for the DART... 
At the very least, we must bring back up Canadian supplies into theatre 
before our contribution is compared to that of our benefactors." The CO 
suggested, however, that "one might point out to the media and the 
NGOs that if the DART Co[mpan]y was not providing the additional 
medical personnel and the transport to get the JMTs into remote areas, 
the demand for medicine would not be as high."58 
The next day, however, though there was still concern over the lack 
of medicines, in general operations had settled into a routine involving 
the delivery of food aid, employment of Joint Medical Teams and 
running the medical clinic. When on the 22nd Minister of Defence Art 
Eggleton toured the facility, "The party was impressed with the medical 
set up and found it interesting that it had been described by local 
officials and by NGOs as the best-equipped hospital in Honduras." 
Mind you, "The lab is having difficulty functioning, as most of the 
equipment does not like the temperature or the humidity."59 
At the village of Ceibita, The clinic was set up in front of a "soil" 
house, a two family dwelling with "no electricity, no water, and no 
sanitation of any kind." Even the tented hospitals the Canadian medical 
practitioners were used to had such amenities, so this particular humani-
tarian relief operation forced them to rely on first principles. And there 
was more, as "The flood line was about five feet up the outside wall and 
it had started to crumble. Apparently, these walls become in[f]ested 
with insects and rodents that spread disease and infections to the people 
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living inside." The clinic's personnel consisted of two Canadian doc-
tors, a nurse and a military medical assistant, along with security peo-
ple, as well as a couple of Honduran doctors and a pharmacy run by two 
of their compatriots. Furniture consisted of a few three-foot tables, 
some chairs and benches, patients being interviewed and examined in 
the open. "It was primitive but impressive at the same time, especially 
when you consider the number of people seen (upwards of 200)."60 It 
proved to be the peak of the DART's deployment. 
On 26 November the unit's commanding officer reported that the 
standing clinic was being used "less and less." Plans were to close it 
down within days, though Joint Medical Teams would continue to work 
in the more isolated valley villages, concentrating on disease prevention 
and inoculation under the auspices of the Honduran Ministry of Health. 
In fact, four days later such teams were in La Paz and El Olivido to 
begin immunizing local people, noting "a substantial improvement in 
the health of the population, in general," a sign that the immediate crisis 
was ebbing.61 The DART returned to Canada soon after. 
Conclusion 
What had been a secondary duty for over a hundred years thus became 
a high priority for the Canadian Forces Medical Service as the twentieth 
century neared its end. There is some question, however, as to whether 
such a change in policy made a noticeable difference in regard to the 
scope and pace of humanitarian relief operations. Of a score or so 
missions examined for this paper, only one was refused, and though 
there may have been other unrecorded occasions when Canadian forces 
declined to provide support, the trend for the period since the end of the 
Second World War is clear. Regardless of where policymakers placed 
such operations in their list of priorities, and even if they chose to leave 
them off the table entirely, they were always part of the military's 
repertoire. One clear motivation was national interest, as humanitarian 
relief overseas showed Canada in a favourable light among people the 
country sought as allies, Tanzania and Italy being prime examples, or 
among potential trade partners, as may well have been the case in Latin 
American countries. 
Furthermore, in regard to training, if one is to prepare medical prac-
titioners for war while the country is at peace, policy makers might have 
come to consider humanitarian relief to be an effective forum for such 
60 DHH, Op Central War Diary, 3914. 
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indoctrination. As Bernard Tardif noted in the afterword of a biography 
of a First World War surgeon, 
Alors que pendant des décennies l'oto-rhino-laryngologie, l'ophtalmologie, la 
neurochirurgie et l'orthopédie s'étaient seules séparées de la chirurgie générale, 
cette dernière est en voie de disparition par éclatement en chirurgie digestive, 
gynécologique, urologique, cardiothoracique, plastique, pédiatrique, etc, et ne voit-
on pas les orthopédistes eux-mêmes s'orienter qui vers la hanche, qui vers le pied 
ou le genou, l'épaule ou la main." 
In fact, "Seuls, peut-être, les chirurgiens qui s'engagent dans les 
actions humanitaires sont-ils encore capables de donner autant dans un 
grand dénuement des moyens."62 
What for decades had not been worthy of any "special training" may 
have become, in the 1990s, a form of combat training in itself. 
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